Recording CSE meetings: the limits set by the Court of cassation

Court of cassation, Social division, October 7, 2026, No. 25-10.664

A Social and Economic Committee (CSE) decides to record its meetings to make it easier to draft the minutes. Considering that the transcripts do not faithfully reflect the discussions held during the meetings, the employer asks for access to the recordings, which the CSE refuses.

The employer then decides to record the CSE meetings itself.

The CSE challenges this and obtains an order from the summary proceedings judge prohibiting these recordings.

The employer appeals to the Court of cassation, which dismisses the appeal.

The Court first notes that Articles L. 2315-34 and D. 2315-27 of the French Labour Code, which allow both the employer and the CSE to record meetings, appear in the sub-section dealing with the minutes. It infers that the sole purpose of recording meetings must be the drafting of the minutes, a prerogative that belongs exclusively to the CSE secretary.

The Court then points out that recording CSE meetings necessarily involves collecting personal data, which must rely on one of the legal bases provided for by the GDPR.

The employer argued that, since the Labour Code authorised it to record CSE meetings, it had a “legitimate interest” within the meaning of the GDPR.

The Court of cassation rejected this reasoning, holding that:

• The employer had made the recordings solely to check that the minutes faithfully reflected the discussions, to keep track of how meetings were conducted and to gather evidence;
• It had therefore acted for purposes unrelated to the drafting of the minutes by the secretary and could not rely on any “legitimate interest” within the meaning of the GDPR.

Although this ruling concerned recordings made by the employer, it appears to apply equally to the CSE: a recording is lawful only if it serves the drafting of the minutes by the secretary.